ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a game-theoretic solution of the surprise examination problem. It is argued that the game of “matching pennies” provides a useful model for the interaction of a teacher who wants her exam to be surprising and students who want to avoid being surprised. A distinction is drawn between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. In both, the teacher should not assign a probability of zero to giving the exam on the last day. This representation of the problem provides a diagnosis of where the backwards induction argument, which “proves” that no surprise exam is possible, is mistaken.

1. THE PROBLEM AND ITS GAME-THEORETIC SETTING

Before the semester begins, a teacher announces to her class that she will give exactly one exam during the semester and that the exam will come as a surprise to the students when it occurs. One of the students in the class reasons as follows:

If the teacher wants to give a surprise exam, she won’t wait until the last day of the semester to give the exam, because the students will be expecting an exam then, if none has been given earlier. So the teacher won’t give the exam on the last day. But if the last day is ruled out, the same reasoning also eliminates the next to last day. After all, if the teacher waits until the next to last day, she will have to give the exam then, since the day after that has been ruled out. But this allows the students to predict an exam on the next to last day, if the teacher fails to give one before then. So no surprise exam on the next to last day is possible either. By a “backwards induction”, each day is ruled out and thus there is no day on which a surprise exam can be given.

The surprise examination problem is to figure out what is wrong with this bit of reasoning. There must be a mistake somewhere; after all, we all know that it is possible to give a surprise exam, even when the students are told at the beginning of the semester that one will occur.

Previous treatments of the problem (reviewed briefly in Sainsbury (1988) and in more detail in Sorensen (1988)) have taken pains to analyze the student’s reasoning, but have spent less time assessing what the teacher must do to give a surprise exam and how the students should respond to the teacher’s chosen strategy. My approach is the reverse; I want to consider
carefully what the teacher and students should do and then, in the light of this, I’ll try to determine where the student’s reasoning goes wrong.

I propose to consider this problem from the point of view of game theory. The teacher’s goal is to give an exam that will surprise the students; the student’s goal is to predict the exam before it occurs, thus frustrating the teacher’s intention. More specifically, I will attempt to identify the best strategy that the teacher can use to decide the day on which the exam will be given and the best strategy for the students to use in predicting when the exam will occur. This is a problem in game theory because which behavior is best for one player depends on what the other player does.¹

The usual assumption in discussions of this problem is that the players are ideal rational agents; they make no logical errors and moreover do not fail to notice pertinent implications of what they believe—they are “logically omniscient”. In addition, each player knows that the other is an ideal rational agent. For example, if it would be rational for the teacher to avoid the last day of the semester as an exam date, she will do so *and* the students will know that she will do so. Rationality is “common knowledge”.² This means that if there is a strategy that is most rational for the teacher to follow, given her goal of surprising the students, the teacher will follow that strategy *and* the students will know that she is doing so.

In addition to diagnosing where the student’s reasoning goes wrong, there is a second feature of the surprise exam problem that needs to be elucidated. There is a peculiar *deliberational instability* that both the teacher and the students seem to experience. Typically, when a person deliberates, the deliberation process terminates in a decision, which further reflection on the information at hand would not displace. However, when teacher and students each make a decision about what they’ll do, their decisions seem to constantly shift because each can calculate what the other is planning to do. For example, if the teacher decides to perform action a and the students think she will perform action b, the students apparently have an incentive to trade their false belief for a true one. However, if the teacher plans to perform a and the students expect this to happen, the teacher seems to have an incentive to shift to a new plan— to perform action c. No matter which pair of decisions the teacher and the students select, one or the other seems to have a reason to change. A game-theoretic analysis should explain whether this appearance of instability is in fact correct.

I will represent the ideas of rationality and common knowledge within a Bayesian framework. Before the semester begins, the teacher and the students are in a state of uncertainty as to when the exam will be; then, by reflection on their own situation and goals as well as on the situation and goals of the other player, they each reach a decision about when the exam will occur. The teacher will select a date, for example, P₁, P₂, . . . , perhaps by mapping her prior probability into a choice of day. The students will then try to anticipate which day the teacher has chosen; their prior probability that the exam will occur on day x will be some p(x), which may have been computed by weighting the teacher’s past behavior. If the exam occurs on day x, the students will be surprised; if the exam occurs on a different day, the students will have a false belief about the date of the exam.

If the exam occurs on some day other than day x, then the students are correct in their belief that the exam did not occur on day x; in this sense, the students have achieved a common knowledge of the fact that the exam did not occur on day x. A surprising exam can be achieved if the teacher institutionalizes the exam to fall on a different day, the day when the students achieve a common knowledge of the fact that the exam did not occur on day x. The surprise is likely to be a function of the students’ prior probability of the exam occurring on day x. More generally, a surprising exam can be achieved if the teacher institutionalizes the exam to fall on the day that the students achieve a common knowledge of the fact that the exam did not occur on any day prior to day x. In this sense, the students can have a common knowledge of the fact that the exam occurred on day x—or they can have a common knowledge of the fact that the exam did not occur on any day prior to day x. The surprise is likely to be a function of the students’ prior probability of the exam occurring on day x.
ex is “common rational for the students; is frustrating for the students; however, the best player will do so

There is a trivial strategy that the students could choose, one that is perfectly coherent within a Bayesian framework, if their only goal is to not be surprised by the exam. To see what this strategy is, suppose the exam is 3 days long. Before the exam begins, let the students assign a probability of 0.99 to an exam on the first day, a probability of 0.0099 to an exam on the second, and a probability of 0.0001 to an exam on the last day. What will happen as the exam unfolds? It is important to see how these prior probabilities get transformed into posterior probabilities if no exam occurs initially and the students take account of this fact:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students’ prior probabilities</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.0099</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students’ posterior probabilities, if there is no exam on previous days</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the exam occurs on the first day, the students will not be very surprised, since they will have assigned that event a probability of 0.99. On the other hand, if there is no exam on the first day, the students will update their prior probabilities and assign the second day a probability of 0.99 of being the exam day. If an exam occurs on day two, the students will again be rather unsurprised. Alternatively, if no exam occurs on the second day, the students will assign a probability of unity to an exam on the third and final day. The students have chosen a strategy that allows them to avoid being surprised by the exam, no matter when the exam occurs.³

The fact of the matter, and there is no paradox here, is that a teacher cannot give a surprise exam to students like this. This means that our
confidence that surprise exams are possible in the real world assumes that real world students are different. How so? Surely the answer is not that real students are being irrational when they fail to adopt the distribution just described. Real students don’t want to be surprised by exams, but they also don’t want to predict exams that fail to occur. If predicting an exam has the behavioral consequence that the students spend time preparing for the exam, it is easy to see why they associate a cost with false prediction. In consequence, we will represent the students as gaining a reward $+x$ if they predict an exam on a day when an exam occurs and as paying a penalty of equal and opposite magnitude when they predict an exam on a day when none occurs. Symmetrically, they pay a penalty of $-x$ when an exam occurs that they have failed to predict, and enjoy a benefit of $+x$ when they correctly predict that no exam will occur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payoffs to students</th>
<th>Exam Occurs</th>
<th>No Exam Occurs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students predict exam</td>
<td>$+x$</td>
<td>$-x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students predict no exam</td>
<td>$-x$</td>
<td>$+x$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is something a little artificial about these assignments. Why assume that students have utilities of precisely these magnitudes for what happens on a given day? And why assume that the utilities associated with one day are the same as the utilities associated with another? Perhaps the students would mind a surprise exam on the third day of the semester less than they would mind one on the thirtieth. A more realistic analysis might associate a different quadruplet of utilities with each of the $n$ days in the semester. Fortunately, our simplifying assumptions about payoffs will not affect the diagnosis concerning where the students go wrong in their backwards induction argument.

Having specified what the students like and dislike, what are we to say of the teacher? To keep things simple, we will assume that she is the mirror image of her students. If she succeeds in giving a surprise exam, she gains a benefit whose magnitude is $+x$; if she gives an exam that the students have predicted, her utility is $-x$; and so on. This simplification also will not affect the points of importance.

2. MATCHING PENNIES

The game of matching pennies is a standard example in the game theory literature; it provides some hints as to what the solution is to the surprise examination game. There are two players, Ms. Hide and Mr. Guess. Hide conceals a penny in one of the pockets of his breast, with equal probability, and then places the coin face down on a table so that neither player can see which pocket it is in. If he guesses incorrectly, and the penny has been hidden in the other pocket, the payoff follows:

- Hide places the coin
- Hide chooses R, Gu
  - (Hide chooses R, Gu)

If each player's choice hinges on what the other player is choosing, Right choices are common or her situation by us in an unending circle

\[ E(Hide) = \]
\[ E(Guess) = \]

The situation radically changes if players use strategies. If they each use a deterministic randomizing device that gives equal probability to each of the $n$ days in the semester. Fortunately, our simplifying assumptions about payoffs will not affect the diagnosis concerning where the students go wrong in their backwards induction argument.

E(Hide) =

E(Guess) =

Notice that if Hide sets $p$ equal to the probability that Guess will choose R, no matter what value he assigns to $p$.
conceals a penny in either her left or her right hand. Guess must say where the penny has been hidden. If he guesses correctly, Hide gives him a penny. If he guesses incorrectly, he must give Hide a penny. Each player has two moves, and the payoffs (listed, as usual, with row before column) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Left</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hide place the coin</td>
<td>+x, -x</td>
<td>-x, +x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hide places the coin</td>
<td>-x, +x</td>
<td>+x, -x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If each player’s choice is limited to either definitely choosing Left or definitely choosing Right, then every pair of choices is unstable, assuming that choices are common knowledge; one player or the other can improve his or her situation by unilaterally changing. Deliberation moves the players in an unending circle:

(Hide chooses R, Guess chooses L) ← (Hide chooses L, Guess chooses L)
\[\downarrow\]
(Hide chooses R, Guess chooses R) → (Hide chooses L, Guess chooses R)

The situation radically changes if the players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. If they each choose a probability distribution, allowing some randomizing device that obeys the favored distribution to select the action they’ll perform, then there exists a pair of choices such that neither player can do better by unilaterally defecting. This configuration is called a Nash equilibrium; it exists when each player assigns Left and Right an equal probability. To see why, we need to represent the expected utility for each player, where \( p \) is the probability that Hide chooses Left and \( q \) is the probability that Guess chooses Left:

\[
E(\text{Hide}) = -(pqx - (1-p)(1-q)x) \\
+ p(1-q)x + (1-p)qx.
\]

\[
E(\text{Guess}) = +(pqx + (1-p)(1-q)x - p(1-q)x) \\
- (1-p)qx.
\]

Notice that if \( p = 0.5 \), then Guess has the same expected utility no matter what value he assigns to \( q \). And if \( q = 0.5 \), then Hide
has the same expected utility no matter what value she assigns to \( p \). There is a Nash equilibrium at \((\text{Hide sets } p = 0.5, \text{Guess sets } q = 0.5)\); no other pair of distributions has this property.

If we assume that players change their distributions if and only if the change would improve their expected utilities, then the \((p = 0.5, q = 0.5)\) configuration is stable; this means that if the players each choose a flat distribution, they will never depart from that choice. However, a separate question may be raised about this equilibrium’s accessibility. If the players begin deliberation with some other pair of distributions, will deliberation lead them to change what they think is best and eventually converge on the Nash equilibrium? Part of the answer to this question is suggested by considering the direction of change that occurs if the players’ assignments are located in each of the four quadrants depicted in Figure 1.

If the players assign low values to \( p \) and \( q \), then Hide will shift to a high value for \( p \). If Hide assigns a high value to \( p \), then Guess will want to assign a high value to \( q \) as well. And so on. We have here the makings of a more-or-less circular flow. But what can be said that is more specific? Will the players circle endlessly, will they spiral into the center, or will they spiral out to the edges?

We now need to consider the specific rules that rational players use to revise their choice of distributions in the light of common knowledge; these rules constitute the dynamics of the process of rational deliberation. Skyrms (1990) considers a family of dynamical rules under which agents adjust their probability assignments by making repeated small changes in the direction that improves their expected utility. In the dynamics that Skyrms favors, the Nash equilibrium is a global attractor in the game of matching pennies (this fails to be true in the case with ellipses centered on \((0.5, 0.5)\)), but I don’t want to add another dynamical rule to the one we have already. So I’ll assume a 50/50 strategy for the unit square and the dynamical assumption that players will choose the 50/50 strategy in the future.

3. THE SURPRISE EXPERIMENT

I suggest that the surprise experiment be done with players matching pennies. It is a game that can be played by students in large groups. One way to do it is as follows. I assign the role of Hide for the first time and have the students select values for \( p \) and \( q \) with each other. The fact that the Hide player has to choose again and again leads to some interesting mistakes and messy play.
3. THE SURPRISE EXAMINATION PROBLEM AS AN ITERATED GAME OF MATCHING PENNIES

I suggest that the surprise examination problem is an iterated game of matching pennies. Before each day of the semester, the teacher and the students must assign probabilities to the remaining days. The first step in this game is for them to choose a pair of distributions over \( n \) days, the second is to construct distributions over \( n - 1 \) days that take account of what happened on the previous day, and so on. Thus, at each stage the players select values for \( p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_r \) and \( q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_r \) respectively, with each attempting to maximize expected utility.

The fact that this game comes in temporal stages, with new probabilities replacing old ones as the semester unfolds, complicates this problem a bit, and leads to a solution that fails to resemble exactly what the game of matching pennies might lead one to expect. To see how the problem should
be analyzed, let’s assume that the semester is just two days long. Before the semester begins, the teacher’s probability of giving an exam on day one is $p$ and her probability of giving an exam on day two is $(1- p)$. Likewise, the students’ prior probabilities are $q$ and $(1- q)$, respectively. If no exam occurs on the first day, the probability of an exam on the second day then becomes unity. The expected utilities for the two players are as follows:

$$E(\text{Teacher}) = p(1-q)x + (1-p)qx - pqx - (1-p)(1-q)x - (1-p)x$$

$$E(\text{Student}) = -p(1-q)x - (1-p)qx + pqx + (1-p)(1-q)x + (1-p)x.$$ 

Each of these expectations has five addends. The first four describe the four possible events that might happen on day 1; the teacher either gives an exam or fails to do so, and the students either predict an exam for that day or fail to do so. The fifth addend takes account of what will happen if the game continues into the second day; this has a probability of $(1-p)$ of occurring, and entails a loss of $x$ for the teacher and a gain of $x$ for the student. Without this fifth addend, the expressions for $E(\text{Teacher})$ and $E(\text{Student})$ are none other than the expressions for $E(\text{Hide})$ and $E(\text{Guess})$; it is the fifth addend that makes the surprise exam problem different from the game of matching pennies.

The two expressions just given simplify to:

$$E(\text{Teacher}) = px(1-2q) + (1-p)x(2q-2)$$

$$E(\text{Student}) = px(2q-1) + (1-p)x(2-2q).$$

If the teacher assigns $p = (1-p) = 0.5$, then the student’s expected utility is $(0.5)x$, a quantity that does not depend on what value the students assign to $q$. Similarly, if the students choose a value for $q$ such that $(1-2q) = (2q-2)$ (i.e., $q = 0.75$), then the teacher’s expected utility is $-(0.5)x$, which is independent of the value she assigns to $p$. This means that the pair (Teacher assigns $p = 0.5$, Students assign $q = 0.75$) forms a Nash equilibrium.

We saw earlier that deliberation in matching pennies is perpetually unstable when the players are limited to considering pure strategies, but stabilizes when the players use mixed strategies. The same point holds for the surprise examination problem. The players do not perpetually shift their decisions abck probabilistic strategies.

4. F

What happens when a three-day semester and the student must choose $q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1$. Let’s investigate the situation in stages, as described above.

$$E(\text{Teacher}) = p_1 + p_2 + p_3$$

This simplifies to

$$E(\text{Teacher}) = p_2 = 0.25x.$$ 

If the students assign $q_1 = 0.25$, the student’s expected utility is $(0.25)x$.

Now let’s consider the situation when the teacher assigns $p = 0.5$.
their decisions about what to do; rather, each settles down to a specific probabilistic strategy.

4. FROM TWO- TO THREE-DAY SEMESTERS

What happens when the semester is made longer? Let's analyze the case of a three-day semester. The teacher must choose values for \( p_1, p_2, \) and \( p_3 \) and the student must assign values to \( q_1, q_2, \) and \( q_3 \) (where \( p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = q_1 + q_2 + q_3 = 1 \)). These are their prior probabilities for an exam on days 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The teacher's expected utility is:

\[
E(\text{Teacher}) = p_1(1 - q_1)x + (1 - p_1)q_1x - p_1q_1x - (1 - p_1)(1 - q_1)x \\
+ (1 - p_1)[1/(p_2 + p_3)(q_2 + q_3)][p_2q_3 \\
+ p_3q_2 - p_2q_2 - p_3q_3]x - p_3x.
\]

This simplifies to

\[
E(\text{Teacher}) = (2p_1 - 1)(1 - 2q_1)x \\
+ [1/(q_2 + q_3)](p_2 - p_3)(q_3 - q_2)x - p_3x.
\]

If the students assign \( q_1 = 20/32, q_2 = 9/32, q_3 = 3/32 \), then \( E(\text{Teacher}) = -0.25x \). To find the other end of the Nash equilibrium, we begin with the student's expected utility:

\[
E(\text{Student}) = (2p_1 - 1)(2q_1 - 1)x \\
+ [1/(q_2 + q_3)](p_3 - p_2)(q_3 - q_2)x + p_3x.
\]

If the teacher assigns \( p_1 = 1/2 \) and \( p_2 = p_3 = 1/4 \), then \( E(\text{Student}) = (0.25)x \).

Now let's compare the Nash equilibria for the two-day and the three-day semesters and see what they imply about the probability of a surprise exam:
The difference between the third and fourth lines is the difference between the probability of the conjunction $\Pr(\text{Exam on day } i \& \text{ Surprise on day } i)$ and the conditional probability $\Pr(\text{Surprise on day } i \mid \text{ Exam on day } i)$. Notice that the probability of the exam’s occurring on the second day of a three-day semester and the students’ being surprised by this is calculated by seeing how a priori probable it is that the exam will occur on that day (1/4) and then taking into account the student’s a posteriori probability that there will be no exam on that day (1/4), given that there was no exam on the day before. It also is worth observing that the two-day and three-day semesters have the same probability (1/4) of the students’ being surprised, if the exam occurs on the next to last day. However, the semesters have different probabilities that the surprise exam occurs on the next to last day.

The trends suggested by these two examples are quite intuitive. In any semester, the probability of a surprise exam declines as the semester unfolds. In addition, the longer the semester, the higher the probability that there will be a surprise exam. Quite obviously, a surprise examination is not impossible. Note also that neither player assigns a probability of zero to an exams occurring on the last day. If the teacher wants to give a surprise exam, her best strategy is to use a distribution in which there is some chance that the exam will be completely unsurprising; more on this later.  

### 5. PRUDENTIAL VERSUS EVIDENTIAL PREDICTION

In the analysis of the two-day and the three-day problem just described, the students choose a distribution that differs from the one that the teacher selects, even though the students know that the teacher controls when the exam will occur and also know which distribution the teacher will select.
This may seem paradoxical, but in fact it is not, once we recognize that the students' predicting an exam was conceptualized as an action, not as a belief driven purely by the evidence at hand. It isn't counter-intuitive that students who are extremely averse to surprise exams, but who don't mind studying when there is no exam, should "predict" an exam even when they think that the probability of an exam is low. They prepare for an exam because they would rather be safe than sorry. The analysis just given has a similar consequence, except that we assumed that the students mind surprise exams exactly as much as they mind preparing when no exam is given. We have viewed prediction as an action that is properly regulated by both evidential and prudential considerations.\(^7\)

If one wishes to view the surprise examination problem in terms of a purely evidential rather than a prudential concept of prediction, a different analysis is needed. Suppose we interpret the common knowledge assumption as forcing the students to believe whatever distribution the teacher selects. The teacher knows that whatever distribution she selects, the students will select the same one. In deliberating, she will not move from distribution \(a\) to distribution \(b\) because she sees that she does better under (Teacher chooses \(b\), Students choose \(a\)) than she does under (Teacher chooses \(a\), Students choose \(a\)); rather, if she moves from \(a\) to \(b\) this will be because she sees that her expected payoff under (Teacher chooses \(b\), Students choose \(b\)) exceeds what she would receive under (Teacher chooses \(a\), Students choose \(a\)).

The solution to this game is that the teacher and the students choose the same flat distribution over the \(n\) day semester. Here is how that distribution unfolds:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>\ldots</th>
<th>(n-1)</th>
<th>(n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>probability of exam assigned at start of semester</td>
<td>(1/n)</td>
<td>(1/n)</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
<td>(1/n)</td>
<td>(1/n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of exam, conditional on there being no exam on previous days</td>
<td>(1/n)</td>
<td>(1/(n-1))</td>
<td>(\ldots)</td>
<td>(1/2)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the students adopt this flat distribution and an exam occurs on a given day, how are we to determine whether the students have been "surprised?" Since we now are viewing the students as adopting a probability distribution, not as performing a behavior, this question requires that a dichotomous category be imposed on a continuous underlying reality. Perhaps we should say that an event "surprises" an agent when the agent assigned that event a probability of 0.5 or less. This would have the intuitive implication that an exam on any day but the last will surprise the...
students. However, in other circumstances, this proposal has peculiar con-
sequences. Suppose three events occur to which an agent had assigned
probabilities of 0.50, 0.51, and 0.99, respectively. According to the pro-
posal, the first is surprising, but the second and third are not. This is an
odd grouping; surely the first two events resemble each other more than
either resembles the third, in terms of how surprising they are. Thus does
the paradox of the heap intrude into the surprise examination problem.

Fortunately, there is no need to choose a threshold that defines when an
event is surprising. If surprise is defined in terms of a threshold of 0.5, then
the probability of a surprise exam during the semester is \( (n - 1)/n \); other
cut-offs would have other implications. And regardless of which threshold
one adopts, the probability of a surprise exam approaches unity as the
semester is lengthened.

There is no need to choose between the prudential and the evidential
interpretations of the surprise examination problem. The relevant features
of the analysis are the same. In both cases, exams that occur earlier in the
semester are more surprising than ones that occur later. And if the semester
is long enough, exams given early are apt to be very surprising indeed.

6. THE LAST DAY

In both the prudential and the purely evidential formulations of the prob-
lem, the teacher does best by choosing a distribution under which there is a
positive probability that the exam will occur on the last day. Given that the
teacher’s goal is to have the exam surprise the students, how can this choice
make sense, since an exam on the last day has no chance of surprising the
students? The direct answer to this question is that the teacher’s choice is a
consequence of the game-theoretic analysis. Still, some explanation is
needed for why this choice seems so counter-intuitive.

I suggest that the optimal distribution seems wrong-headed because we
are inclined to use the following principle about rational action:

(R) Suppose your only ultimate goal is to bring about \( S \) and you
have to decide whether to perform action \( A \). Then, you should
perform \( A \), if you can bring about \( N \) by doing \( A \) and \( N \) will
increase the probability of \( S \).

Principle (R) applies to the decision problem that the teacher faces as
follows:

The symbol \( X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z \\) means that
\( \Pr(Y|X) > \Pr(Y) \) and
\( \Pr(Z|Y) > \Pr(Z) \).

If the exam is on the last day, the teacher
gets a 0.5 chance of surprising the students
\( \Pr(N|A) = 1.0 \), she should
choose this distribution. As it happens, (R)

See why, consider another possible

choice of distribution.

However, it does not

make sense. Suppose an action \( A \). The reason

is that the teacher

causal structure of the

Given the fact that

does best in
costs at

constraint.
peculiar condition. The professor had assigned an exam to the students. This is an unusual feature of the exam; typically an exam is given on the last day, with a probability of 0. Thus does not apply in this case.

Even when an exam is given on the last day of the first week, and a new exam is given on the next day, the probability of an exam being given on the last day is typically 1/n, where n is the number of days in the course. Thus, if n = 1, then the probability of an exam being given on the last day is 1/n = 1.

The evidential value of the event is higher if the exam is given on the last day. This is because the exam is a more significant event for the students. The exam is given on the last day if the probability of an exam being given on the last day is 1/n.

As it happens, (R) is a spurious principle, and the fact that the teacher’s choice of distribution violates (R) is no criticism at all of what she does. To see why, consider another application of (R) that seems on the surface to make sense. Suppose a peacock’s only ultimate goal is to be reproductively successful; – i.e., to reach reproductive age and then have as many offspring as possible. Attracting mates raises the probability of reproductive success. And the peacock can attract mates by growing a gaudy tail. So the causal structure of the example seems to be as follows:

However, it does not follow that the peacock is well-advised to perform action A. The reason is that there are other consequences of growing a gaudy tail. Gaudy tails attract predators as well as mates:

Given this fuller causal picture, it is an open question whether the peacock does best by growing the tail; it is easy to imagine a scenario in which the costs and benefits entail that this would not be advisable.
A similar complication arises in the surprise examination problem. Just as (2') is a fuller representation of the causal facts than (2), so we can replace (1) with:

\[ (1') \]

Growing a gaudy tail has two consequences for the peacock, and these have opposite effects on whether the bird will achieve his ultimate goal of being reproductively successful. In similar fashion, making sure that there is no exam on the last day of the semester has two effects, and these have opposite ramifications for whether the exam will come as a surprise. By ignoring the second consequence (\(P\)) and focusing exclusively on the first (\(N\)), it comes to seem obvious that the teacher should rule out the last day. She should do no such thing.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BACKWARDS INDUCTION ARGUMENT

What does this probabilistic analysis imply about the reasoning that constitutes the surprise exam paradox? Where does the backwards induction argument go wrong?

As noted earlier, people frequently describe the world in dichotomous categories when the underlying reality is continuous. We talk of believing propositions and of events being surprising, when the fact of the matter is that we have degrees of belief and find events surprising to a certain extent. To be sure, it is often overly fastidious to describe the probabilities that we take propositions to have; we frequently find it entirely natural simply to assert those propositions outright. When we leave our places of work for the day, we turn to our fellow workers and say “see you tomorrow”. It would raise eyebrows to say “the probability that I will see you tomorrow is 0.999”. A teacher who plans to give a surprise exam in a semester that

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is, say, fifteen weeks long, is following the same convention when she says “there will be a surprise exam this semester”. The chances of her being wrong are small, so why should she bother to be more precise?

The surprise examination problem shows that there are contexts in which departing from a more precise quantitative formulation can lead one astray. To see why, let’s first represent the student’s argument in terms of dichotomous categories; then, I’ll correct that argument by describing the underlying quantitative reality. Here is how the student reasons in his effort to show that no surprise exam will occur:

(0) The teacher will give just one exam and she wants it to be surprising.
(1) If the teacher gives the exam on the last day, it will not be surprising.
(2) Hence, the teacher will not give the exam on the last day.
(3) If the teacher gives the exam on the next to last day, it will not be surprising.
(4) Hence, the teacher will not give the exam on the next to last day.

And so on. Formulated in this way, the student’s reasoning goes wrong at the first step. Premisses (0) and (1) are true, but (2) does not follow. As we have seen, a rational teacher who wants to give a surprise exam will not assign a probability of 0 to giving the exam on the last day. True, she will make this the least probable exam day, and if the semester is sufficiently long, an exam on the last day will be extremely improbable. But (2) overstates what follows from the preceding premisses. The next step in the argument goes wrong as well, but in a more egregious fashion. An exam on the next to last day will be more surprising than an exam on the last day. And a rational teacher will assign to the next to last day a higher probability of being the exam date than she assigns to the last day of the semester. The backwards induction argument gets worse and worse. Early steps involve fairly modest departures from the underlying probabilistic reality; later steps involve more extreme departures.

We see here an affinity between the surprise exam problem and Kyburg’s (1961) lottery paradox. Suppose you know that a lottery in which there are 10,000 tickets is fair; one ticket will win and each has the same chance of winning. Each proposition of the form “ticket i will not win” has a probability of 0.9999. If you accept a proposition precisely when its probability exceeds some threshold (0.99, for example), then you should accept each such proposition. However, the conjunction of these propositions contradicts the starting assumption that some ticket will win.

Whatever solution one favors for this problem, it seems clear that “acceptance” is a problematic concept. We assign probabilities to propositions that describe the outcomes of chance processes; if, in addition, we either accept or reject those propositions, what does this mean? If it means any-
thing, the rules for acceptance and rejection must be more subtle than
the threshold criterion just described. This is not to deny that it is often
good enough to talk about the propositions that we “accept”. However, we
must recognize that this coarse-grained dichotomous description can get
us into trouble. The lottery paradox and the surprise examination problem
describe two contexts in which this can happen.

Although I have described the backwards induction as beginning with
a premiss that describes what the teacher intends to do, some readers may
prefer a formulation in which the argument begins with a re-assertion of
the teacher’s announcement. But let us ask, in the light of the preceding
analysis, why the students should take this as a premiss. The naive answer
is that the teacher said she’ll give a surprise exam, she intends to do what
she said, and she has the power to make what she said come true; since
the teacher is rational, it follows that she will do what she says she’ll
do. The points about what the teacher said, and about her intentions and
rationality, are given by the problem’s formulation, or embody common
sense background assumptions that might as well be regarded as given.
But what of the point about power? We have seen that a rational teacher
who is dealing with rational students under the assumption of common
knowledge has the power only to make a surprise exam highly probable.
To assume, before the semester begins, that her announcement is true, and
not just highly probable, is to assume too much.

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

It might be suggested that I have used a cannon to kill a flea. The game-
theoretic analysis shows that if the semester is long enough, it is highly
probable, but not certain, that the exam will surprise the students. However,
it doesn’t take game theory to see that the backwards induction is unsound
if a surprise exam is merely probable.10

In reply, let me say that game theory explains why the assumption that
the players are rational (and that this is common knowledge) is incom-
patible with what the teacher says if that announcement is interpreted as
describing what will happen, not just what will probably happen. It might
appear that the teacher can ensure that her exam will be surprising, just
as she can simply choose the day on which the exam occurs. However,
the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge entail that she can
ensure nothing of the kind. The best the teacher can do is something more
modest.

Not only does a probabilistic representation of the problem explain
what is wrong with the teacher’s announcement; it also explains why
the teacher’s announcement seems so unexceptionable. It is something like a convention of conversation to omit probabilistic qualifications of statements that are overwhelmingly probable. We are used to this simplification’s not getting us into trouble, and so there seems to be nothing suspicious about the teacher’s announcement.

The game-theoretic approach provides several further benefits. It provides a precise diagnosis of what goes wrong in the student’s backwards induction argument. By identifying the distributions that the two players will use, we can see how the backwards induction argument degenerates as the steps are iterated. A probabilistic framework also explains why the teacher should not absolutely rule out giving the exam on the last day, even though she knows that an exam on that day will be completely unsurprising. In addition, this approach elucidates the difference between prudential and evidential versions of the problem. And finally, the game-theoretic formulation provides a model of the deliberation process itself, one that undercuts the impression that rational players must be trapped in a chain of reasoning that is perpetually shifting. This is true if the players consider only pure strategies; however, if they help themselves to probabilities, deliberation can stabilize, just as in the game of matching pennies.

NOTES

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1 Cargile (1967) also describes the surprise examination problem in game-theoretic terms. However, he rejects the idea that the teacher should use probabilities to choose an exam date (pp. 559, 561). Also, his proposed solution to the problem appeals to the idea that knowledge claims demand different standards of evidence in different contexts (pp. 562–63). Neither of these elements will be present in the analysis I propose.
2 “Common knowledge” just means that there is a nested set of true beliefs that the two players have about each other; these true beliefs don’t have to count as knowledge in any stronger sense.
3 There is nothing special about 0.99 in this argument. It is possible for the students to be as certain as you please of an exam on each day; let their posterior probability of an exam on day i, given that no exam occurred previously, be 1 − e for arbitrarily small e. Since Bayesian updating by conditionalization is impossible if agents assign probabilities of 1’s and 0’s, we assume that e ≠ 0.
4 The circular flow depicted in Figure 1 also characterizes the dynamics of an evolutionary model that describes how lying and truth-telling coevolve with a policy concerning credulity and skepticism; see Sober (1994).
5 The assumption of Bayesian rationality entails that the first distribution over n days determines what the subsequent distributions will be.
There are variations on the surprise examination problem, as just construed, that have slightly different solutions. For example, let the payoffs be as described, except that neither player gains or loses on a day when there is no exam and the students have not predicted one. Here the Nash equilibrium when the semester is two days long is (Teacher chooses $p = 0.33$, Students choose $q = 0.67$). Alternatively, suppose the students must guess at the start of the semester when they think the exam will occur. Now the surprise examination problem and the game of matching pennies are identical; days in the first problem correspond to fists in the second.

Pascal’s wager is perhaps the most famous problem in which prudential and evidential criteria for belief come into conflict. Mougin and Sober (1994) consider the wager in connection with the issue of deliberational instability.

More precisely, “$X \rightarrow \circ \rightarrow Y$” means that $X$ raises the probability of $Y$, when other causal factors are held fixed. $X$ is a positive causal factor for $Y$ in the sense discussed in the literature on probabilistic causality. See, for example, Eells (1991).

Olin (1983) also argues that the surprise examination problem and the lottery paradox are connected, but for different reasons.

An anonymous referee of this journal has suggested that the solution developed here is a Bayesian version of Quine’s (1953) proposal. Quine points out that the teacher’s announcement, taken by itself, does not lead to contradiction; to generate a paradox, Quine says, one must additionally suppose that the students know that the teacher’s announcement is true. Quine denies that the students know this. He does not explain what he means by knowledge, nor does he explain what it is about the teacher’s announcement that places it beyond the students’ ken. Quine also does not show that paradox requires that the concept of knowledge be used; it isn’t obvious that weaker or different concepts cannot have the same effect.

In any event, the suggested parallelism is this: just as Quine says that the students cannot know that the announcement is true, so a Bayesian will say that the announcement, since it expresses a contingent proposition, should not be assigned a probability of 1.0. The referee is correct that it is a consequence of my analysis that the probability of there being a surprise exam in a finite semester is less than unity; however, the reason the analysis has this consequence is not the one suggested.

The point about Bayesianism applies only to evidential Bayesianism; in the prudential formulation of the problem, there is no general Bayesian prohibition against the students’ deciding that, with probability one, they will prepare for an exam on every day of the semester; this is what “predicting” an exam means in the behavioral sense of performing an action that counts as predicting. If this assignment isn’t rational for them, that is because of the utilities they happen to have, not because of a general Bayesian principle. As for the evidential version of the problem, the reason the students don’t assign a probability of unity to there being an exam on any given date is that this isn’t the best strategy for the teacher to adopt, and the students know this.

There is a further difference. Quine diagnoses where the backwards induction argument goes wrong by saying that an illicit assumption of knowledge is the culprit. This assumption can be judged independently to be implausible, if knowledge is taken to require rational certainty and if it is never rational to be certain about the truth value of a contingent proposition. If knowledge is understood in some other way, however, it isn’t obvious why the students cannot know that the teacher’s announcement is true. In the analysis I have proposed, a surprise exam will be very probable if the semester is long enough, and the students can know this at the start of the semester. Whether this provides them with a justified belief that a surprise exam will occur depends on the resolution of problems raised
by the lottery paradox. If the belief is justified and true, whether it counts as knowledge depends on the resolution of problems raised by Gettier (1963). In my formulation, these questions about the nature of knowledge do not need to be resolved to see where the backwards induction goes wrong.

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